More On Preferences and Freedom by Romero-Medina, Antonio
More on preference and freedom 
Antonio Romero-Medina 
Departamento de Economía, Universidad Carlos III de Madrid, 28903 Getafe, 
Madrid, Spain (e-mail: aromero@eco.uc3m.es) 
Abstract. The paper seeks to fonnalize the notion of effective freedom or the 
freedom to realize meaningful choices. The definition of meaningful choice 
used in this paper is based on the preference orderings that a reasonable per-
son may have. 1 argue that only alternatives that can be selected by a reason-
able person from the set 01' all possible alternatiV'es provide a meaningful 
choice. 1 discuss this approach and provide an axiomatization of the cardi-
nality rule and two lexicographic versions of this rule in this context. 
1 Introduction 
Choosing foroneself and shaping ones own life is essential for a meaningful 
human !.ife. With this idea in mind this paper explores sorne issues regarding 
the intrinsic value of freedom of choice. The paper considers an agen.t who 
faces alternative feasible sets, A, B, etc. Each one of these sets is a non-empty 
subset of sorne given universal set of alternatives X. Confronted with one of 
these sets, the agent has to choose exactly one among the possible alternatives. 
The problem considered is how to rank different sets according to the freedom 
that they offer. The paper focuses on !he capacity of the feasible sets to pro-
vide meaningful choices. 1 shall discriminate between the alternatives that 
constitute meaningful choices and those that do not. 1 use as a reference the 
set of preferences that a reasonable person may have and the alternatives that 
she may choose in the universal set of alternatives. 
1 am grateful to Prasanta K. Pattanaik for many stimulating discussions and he1pful 
suggesticins. Several improvements are due to the comments of Salvador Barberá, 
Iñigo Iturbe-Ormaetxe and an anonymous referee. Financial support from DGESIC 
project PB 98-024 is gratefully acknowledged. 
Sen (1991) pointed out the need for introducing preferences into the anal-
ysis of the freedom. According to his idea of effective freedom, an individual is 
free if she has access to alternatives that she regards as valuable in terms of 
sorne criteria. These criteria may be her own preferences or the pr.eferences 
that a reasonable person in her place may have. 
Jones and Sugden (1982) first suggested t,he use of the preferences of a 
reasonable person as a reference point for the evaluationofthe freedom that a· 
set of alternatives offers. According to them, "if any reasonable person would 
be indifferent between two particular alternatives, then offering choice con-
tr.ibutes httle to diversity." Pattanaik and Xu (1998) take the role of prefer-
ences a step forward. For them, the intrinsic value of freedom of choice should 
be judged "not [in terms of] the preferences that thc agent actually has. nor [in 
terrns of] ... his future preference ordering, but [in terms of] the preference 
orderings that a reasonable person in the agent's situation can possibly have." 
The model they propose has the virtue of capturing effectiv.e freedom without 
collapsing into an indirect utility ranking. 
In comparingtwo opportunity sets, A and B, Pattanaik and Xu (1998) 
concentrate on A and B, where A is the set of all alternatives in A which rea-
sonable persons may choose from the feasible set- A, and similarly for B. This 
paper, however, follows a different approach. I first consider the set X of all 
altematives in the universal set X that reasonable p.:ople will c~oose if the 
universal set was feasible. Then 1 concentrate on X n A anc! X n B when 
comparing A and B. The intuitive difference between the procedure of Patta-
naik and Xu (1998) and the procedure discussed here can be illustrated with 
an example. 
Consider the case where the universal set X containsfour alternatives: Jife 
imprisonment, being beheaded, being hanged and being killed in the electric 
chair. Suppose that there are two sets of altematives A and B to be ranked. 
The set A contains three alternatives: being beheaded, being hanged and being 
killed in the electric chair. The set B contains two alternatives: being hanged 
and being killed in the 'electric chair. It is plausible to assume that every rea-
sonable person will prefer life imprisonment to any of the other alterna ti ves. It 
is also reasonable to think that facing, the possibility of death, we can find a 
reasonable person who may prefer any of the possible methods of execution 
figuring in X or may be indifferent between them. 
The first rule characterized by Pattanaik and Xu (1998) considers A and B 
to be the relevant sets of alternatives when comparing A and B. Under this 
rule, one set offers more freedom than another if it contains a larger number 
of 'relevant' alternatives. Therefore, A is regarded as offering more freedom 
than B if and only if A's cardinality is greater than B's. In a second rule Pat-
tanaik and Xu (1998) compare the number of alternatives in the intersection 
of A and the choices ora reasonable person in A u B, that is, the number of 
alternatives in A u B n A, with that in A u B n B. Again, A is considered as 
offering more freedom than B if the cardinality of the first is greater than that 
of the second. Both characterizations give importance in terrns of freedom of 
choice to alternatives that are irrelevant to the agent. They are irrelevant in 
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the sense that they would never be chosen by a reasonable person if the entire 
set X was feasible. Irrelevant alternatives are unable to fulfill a vital project 
because no reaso)1able person will ever choose them. A reasonable person will 
never choose the alternative of being beheaded at dawn as the alternative that 
helps her in "shaping his [her]life in accordance with sorne overall plan," and 
only a "being with the capacity so to ,shape his life can have or strive for a 
meaningful life" (Nozick 1974, p. 50). 
The idea that one should consider only those options which are meaningful 
in the context of "shaping ones own life" is captured formally in this paper 
using X 11 A and XII B as the relevant alternatives when comparing A and B. 
In the example both A and B are declared indifferent in terms of the freedom 
they offer beca use no reasonable person will choose an alternative in these sets 
if her choice is not constrained. 
Choosing for oneself and shaping ones own Jife is essential for a meaning-
fui human life. The alternatives that can be chosen by a reasonable person in a 
society where no constraints exist are the ones that allow the agents to shape 
their lives and provide them with full control over themselves. If only the 
composition of the particular set is relevant for measuring the freedom that 
this set offers, then a person who has to choose between three different ways to 
die can have more freedom than another person wllO is able to choose be-
tween life ~nd death. AIso, a slave who has to choo§e among hundreds of es-
cape plans can have more freedom than her master who decides among fewer 
options, even when the master's options are more real and desirable, in the 
eyes of any reasonable person, than the slave's dreams of freedom. 
The fOlfuS on the set of alternatives a reasonable person may choose from 
the universal set can genera te situations that may seem puzzling. This is be-
cause alternatives that are not fe asible have a role in evaluating the freedom 
that a set offers. Let us Consider a situation where all the reasonable persons in 
a society beJieve that a particular woman, a, is the most desirable mate. These 
preferences may seem inadequate when deaJing with the problem of choosing 
a reasonable mate. However they are not far from the preferences thal chil-
dren seem to have over Christmas presents. In that case the sets A = {c,d,b} 
and B = {d, b} are indifferent in terms of the number of alternatives that 
intersect with X. Even if a is unanimously considered the best possible choice, 
it may seem hard to c1aim that both A and B contain as much freedom as the 
empty set. However, if the social consensus is such that only a can fulfill the 
individuals' vital project, even if the selection of sorne other alternative can 
provide sorne utility, a set where a is not included will offer no valuable al-
ternative in terms of freedom, i.e. no freedom at all. 
This example is, somehow, pathological. A reasonable person may have 
any preference that is not contradictory or illogical. In the example it is not 
unthinkable that any woman can be the best mate for sorne reasonable per-
son. The freedom attributed to a set depends on the preferences conceived as 
reasonable. Therefore the comparison between two sets will be paradoxical 
only if the preferences attributed to reasonable people are ·so. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The next section introduces 
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sorne notation and definitions. Section 3 contains the main characterization 
result. The characterized rule provides a complete order of the sets of alter-
natives. In Sect. 4 two lexicographic versions of the previous rule are consid-
ered. The relation between the original approach and its lexicographic ver-
sions is also discussed. The paper finishes with sorne final remarks in Sect. 5. 
2 Notation and definitions 
Let X be thefinite universal set of alternatives. At any given time, the agent 
faces a non-empty subset of X. Let Z be the set of al! non-empty subsets of X. 
The elements of Z are the feasible sets that the agent may face. Among these 
feasible alternatives she chooses exactly one. Let ::: be a binary relation 
defined over Z. For all A, B E Z, [A ::: B] means that A olfers at least as much 
freedom as B. For all A, B E Z, [A >- B iff A ::: B and --,(B::: A)] and 
[A ~ B iff A ::: B and B::: A]. . 
The reference set of preference orderings over X is denoted as p = 
(R 1, ••• • Rn ). A preference ordering over X is a reflexive, complete and tran-
sitive weak preference relation, 'at least as good as', over X. p will be inter-
preted as the set of all possible preference orderings over X that a reasonable 
person may have. I denote by max(A) the set of all'alternatives x in A such 
that x is a best alternative in X for sorne ordering in r;.J. Let .1'(r;.J) = max(X). 
I will call :?l'(r;.J) the set of relevant alternatives in X. 
The binary relation ::: over Z may satisfy several properties. 
Definition ~. A binary relation ::: over Z satisfies: 
J. indifference o.fno-choice situations (INS) ifjJor al! x,y E X, {x} ~ {y}; 
2. simple non-dominance (SND) ifj; for al! X,YEX. if #max({x}) = 
#max({y}), then {x} ~ {y}; 
3. inclusion monotonicity (IMON) iff, for al! A, B E Z if A :::2 B and 
max(A\B) 1= 0, then A >- B. IfA :::2 B and max(A\B) = 0, then A ~ B; 
4. composition (eO M) iff, far al! A, B, C, D E Z, such that A n e = B n D = 
o and A, B, e, D ~ Y'(p), 
[A ::: B and e::: D] --+ [A u e::: Bu D], and, 
[A::: B and e>- D] --+ [A u e >- Bu D] 
The previous axioms are versions of traditional ones adapted to the con-
text of the paper, which provides them with a new meaning. The INS is a 
c1assical axiom. However, we can think of situations where INS fails to cap-
ture the idea of elfective freedom. For example, consider two situations, such 
that in each case you must read a book. In the first case the book considered is 
a telephone directory. In the second, the book is one that a reasonable person 
may have chosen from the set of all the available books ever written. INS will 
rank both sets as indilferent, but, intuitively, the two sets seem to olfer very 
dilferent degrees of freedom. The second set contains a readable book. How-
ever, no reasonable person will consider the telephone directory readable. 
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Therefore, this first set is empty from a reader's point of view and thus less 
preferred than the second seto INS, however, cannot capture this situation 
where we compare a set containing a book and an empty set. In the model, the 
spirit of INS is captured by SND when the alternatives compared are both 
relevan!. The cardinality rule characterized in the next section does not satis!y 
INS but satisfies SND. 
IMON adapts a preference independent axiom, one that Sen (1991) called 
weak dominance. IMON requires that set inc\usion of relevant alternatives 
implies preference. It restricts the role of non-relevant alternatives and 
exc\udes them from consideration whena set is compared with one of its 
subsets. 
The COM axiom was originally defined by Sen (1991). It requires only that 
A n e = B n D = 0. As Pattanaik and Xu (1998) remark, there may be dif-
ferences in the contributions that sets e and D give to A and B. To avoid this 
problem they impose the restriction that all alternatives in A v e and in B vD 
are 'relevan!' alternatives in their sense. In line with the same approach, 1 
simplify the axiom for the context defined in this paper. It is enough that the 
sets considered are subsets of3"(f¡J) and it is not necessary to postulate 
restrictions on their unions. 
3 The result 
In this section 1 characterize the binary relation defined by the cardinality rule 
in terms of relevant alternatives. This is, for all A, BE Z, 
A ;:;:* B <-> #max(A) ;:;; #max(B). 
That is, a set A will be declared preferred to B if and only if the number 01' 
relevant alternatives that A contains is bigger than the number of relevant 
alternatives contained in B. 
Proposition 1. ;:;: satisfies SND, COM and IMON ifand only if;:;: = ;:;:*. 
Prooj. The necessity part of the proposition is straightforward; 1 prove only 
the sufficiency part. This proof has two stages. Let ;:;: satisfy SND, COM and 
IMON. First, 1 show that: 
for all A, B E Z, if #max(A) = #max(B), then A-B. (1) 
Suppose A, B E Z and #max(A) = #max(B) = g. Let max(A) = 
{al, .... ay} and max( B) = {h l , ... ,by}. By SND, 
{Ol} - {h l } (2) 
and 
(3) 
{od n {bd = {a]} n {b2} = 0 and, further max({ad) = {ad, max( {a2}) = 
{(/2} and max({ h l }) = {h l }. max( {b 2 }) = {h 2 }, since 01,02 E max(A) and b l , 
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b2 E max(B). Hence by (2), (3) and COM, I have 
{al,a2} - {bl,b2}. 
By SND, again, 
{a3} - {bJ}. 
By (4), (5) and COM, 
(4) 
(5) 
(6) 
Proceeding in this way, I final!y have {al,' .,a,/} - {bl, ... ,b,/}, that is 
max(A) - max(B). Ir A = max(A), then A - max(B). Suppose {A\max(A)} 
# 0. Let {A\max(A)} = {al, ... ,am } # 0. It is clear that TI = max(A) u 
{al, ... ,am } is such that TI s;A and max(A\TI ) = 0. Then, by IMON, 
TI - max(B). Hence I ha ve 
A - max(B). (7) 
Similarly, by IMON, from (7), we have A - B, which proves (1). 
Next, I show: 
foral! A,BEZ, if #max(A) > #max(B), thenA >- B. (8) 
Suppose A,BEZ and #max(A)> #max(B). Let #max(B)=g and 
#max(A)=g+t (where t>O). Further, let max(B) = {bl, ... ,by} and 
max(A) = {al, ... ,aq, ... ,aY+l}' Note that max{al,." ,ay} = {al, ... ,ay}. 
Hence, by (1), 
(9) 
since max(A) = {al, ... ,ay, ... ,aY+l} it is clear that T,/+I = max{al, ... ,aq} 
u {ay+d is such that {al, ... ,aq } S; Tq+1 and max(Tq+I\{al, ... ,aq}) # 0. 
Then by IMON and (9), it fol!ows that 
T,/+ I >- {al, . .. ,ay} 
and by (9) 
Tq+1 >- max(B). (10) 
Taking (10), adding aq+2, ... ,ay+! on the left hand side, and using IMON 
repeatedly, I ha ve 
{al, ... , ay+ l } >- B. (11) 
Taking (11) and using an argument similar to the one used to establish (7), by 
IMON, I have A >- B, which proves (8). (1) and (8) complete the proof of the 
sufficie,?cy part of the proposition. • 
The binary relation ~* is transitive. Given ~*, indifference between two 
sets may arise either beca use each of them has an empty intersection with 
:9i'(¡::¡) or beca use the two intersections with 9(¡::¡) have the same number of 
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elements. In both cases, particularly the first one, a lexicographic version of 
the original rule may enrich the ranking al1<;>w us to discriminate between such 
sets. 
4 A lexicographic approach 
The set of preferences that a reasonable person may have should be rich 
enough and should take into account any valuable alternative in terms of 
freedom. Nevertheless, there may be situations where the aspirations of a 
reasonable person in X cannot be satisfied in the sets to be compared. Let us 
consider the example of a country where free press is not available and there is 
a consensus that free newspapers are the uniquely relevant choice. Even in 
that case it can be c1aimed that different sets of 'not free' newspapers may 
. provide alternatives that deserve sorne value in terms of freedom. 
Admitting this possibility, one way of adapting the previous approach may 
be to sequentially remove the first element in all the reasonable persons' pref-
erences and compare the available sets of newspapers according to this new 
set of preferences. This new reference set where alternatives are sequentially 
eliminated, does not represent the absolute idea of freedom proposed in the 
first section of this paper. Instead, it is a compromised idea of freedom that 
can only be justified when the set of reasonable preferences cannot discrimi-
nate among the sets of alterna ti ves. 
Two different lexicographic versions are studied in this section. The first 
one elimina tes the most preferred elements in a reasonable person's prefer-
ences until the preferences are able to discriminate between the two sets. A 
second lexicognlphic ranking proposes a stronger criterion. This second crite-
rion declares A to be weakly preferred to B only if the intersection of A with 
the set of relevant alternatives generated from the sequential elimination of 
the most preferred elements in the set of reasonable persons' preferences is 
always equal or greater than that of B. 
Let R) be the preference where the first element has been removed. Denote 
the set of alternatives in X that are in R) as R). In general 
R' == {Ri-I - {e} I Vv x E Ri-I X E e <--+ xRi-ly} 
I J • , J' J 
where R; - {e} den<:>tes the preference R; where the alternatives in e have 
been removed. I denote by f?i = (R;, . .. ,R~) the set of preference orderings 
over X where the best elements have been removed ¡times from the' set of 
preferences that a reasonable person may have. Thus maxi(A) is the set of all 
alternatives x in A such that x is a best alternative in X for sorne ordering in 
rJ'. Let .J'(rJi) be the set of alternatives in maxi(X). 
For all A, B E Z, [A ;::i B] will be interpreted as "A offers at least as much 
fréedom as B according to rf'. For aH A, B E Z, [A ,;-i B iff A ;::' B and 
-,(B;::i A)] and [A ~i B iff A ;::i B and B;::i A). 
Now I consider a number of properties of the binary relation ;:: over Z. 
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Definition 2. A binary relalion ;::: over Z satisftes: 
l. simple non-dominance by leuels (SND') ifJ;,for (/11 x,y E X, [if #max'(x) 
=#max'(y), Ihen {x} _i {y}]: 
2. inclusion monotonicity by levels (l M O Ni) iff; ./ór all A, B E Z if A ;:> B 
and maxi(A\B) =1- 0, then A ,;-i B. ff A ;:> B and maxi(A\B) = 0, then 
A -'B: 
3. property 1 (P-l) ijj; for all A, B E Z if #maxi(A) = #maxi(B) ./ór all i, 
then A - B; 
4. property 2 (P-2) ijj; ./ór all A, B E Z if #maxi(A) > #maxi(B) and 
# max J (A) = # maxJ (B) ./ór all j < i, then A ';- B; 
5. property 3 (P-3) ijj; for all A, B E Z if there is a level i su eh Ihat 
#maxi(A) > #maxi(B), Ihen ,(B;::: A). 
The first two axioms are an adaptation of the SND and IMON defined in 
SecL l. They apply to the different levels in which the set of relevant alter-
natives may be defined, The axioms P-I, P-2 and P-3 are three preference-
dependent axioms. Property I stipulates that, if two sets have the same num-
ber of relevant alternatives for any ~:/, then they wil! be considered indifferent 
in terms of freedom. Axiom P-2 requires that A be preferred to B in terms of 
freedom if the number of relevant alternatives in A is bigger than that in B 
according to .?7>(~i), and no other .oJ'(~J), .i < i, gives a different number of 
relevánt alternatives for one of the sets. Axiom P-3 ih1plies that ir A has more 
relevant elements than B according to sorne .q)'(~i), then B is not going to be 
preferred to A. 
The binary relation ;:::i that represents a lexicographic version 01' ;:::' IS 
such that, ' 
f '11 B [)-' B 'ff { #max'(A) = #maxJ(B) for allj < i ] or a A, E Z, A ~ 1 ..
3i such that #max'(A) > #max'(B). 
(12) 
Proposition 2. ;::: satisfies SND i, COM, P-l, P-2 and lMONi if' and only if 
)- =)-i 
~ ~. 
Proof The necessity part 01' the proposition is straightforward; 1 prove the 
sufficiency part. Let ;::: satisfy SND i , COM, P-I, P-2 and IMON i . First, 1 
show: 
for all A, B E Z, if #maxi(A) = #maxi(B) for al! i, then A-B. (13) 
Suppose A, B E Z and #maxi(A) = #maxi(B) = g. Let maxi(A) = 
{al, ... ,ag } and maxi(B) = {b l , ... ,bg }. By SND i, 
{a¡} -'{b¡} (14) 
and 
{az} _, {bz}· (15) 
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{ad ('¡ {bd = {a2} ('¡ {b2} = 0 and, further max i( {ad) = {ad, max i( {a2}) 
= {a2} and maxi({bd) = {bd, maxi( {b2}) = {b2} (since al, a2 E maxi(A) 
and b l ,b2 E maxi(B)). Hence by (14), (15) and COM, I have 
{al,a2} -' {b l,b2}' 
By SND', again, 
{a3} -' {b 3 }· 
By (16), (17) and COM, 
{al,a2,a3} ~'{bl,b2,b3}' 
(16) 
( 17) 
(18) 
Proceeding in this way, l.finaIly have {al, ... ,ay } _i{bl, ... ,by }, that is, 
maxi(A) _i max'(B). If A = maxi(A), thm A _i maxi(B). Suppose 
{A\maxi(A)} =f. 0. Let {A\maxi(A)} = {al, ... ,am } =f. 0. It is c1ear that 
TI = maxi(A) u {al} is such that TI s;: A and maxi(A\T¡) = 0. Th.en, by 
IMON i and (18), I have A ~'max'(B) in this case. Thus, in aIl cases, 
A ~'max'(B). ( 19) 
Similarly, using IMON' in (19), A ~'B for alI i. By P-I, A ~ B, which proves 
(13). 
Next, I show: 
, '11 A B Z 'f { #maxJ(A) = #maxJ(B) for alIj < i Jor a , E , 1 ..
ji such that #max'(A) > #max'(B) then A >- B. 
(20) 
Suppose A, B E Z and #maxi(A) > #maxi(B). Let #maxi(B) = 9 and 
#maxi(A) = 9 + 1 (where 1> O). Further, let maxi(B) = {b l, ... ,by} and 
maxi(A) = {al, ... ,a'I"" ,a,,+¡}. Note that max'{al"" ,a,,} = {al,'" ,ay}. 
Hence, by (13), 
(21) 
since maxi(A) = {al, ... , ag, ... , aY+I}, it is c1ear that Tq+1 = 
maxi{al, ... ,ay} u {ay+d is such that {al, ... ,ay}s;:T,,+1 and 
maxi(T'I+1 \ {al,.·· , ay}) =f. 0. Then, by IMON i and (21), it folIows that 
T,,+I >-i {al, ... ,ay} 
and by (21) 
T'/~I >-' max'(B). (22) 
Taking (22), adding (/'1/ 2 , ... ,aye , on the left hand side, and using IMON i , 1 
have 
(23) 
Taking (23) and using an argument similar to the one used to prove (19), by 
IMON i, I have A >-i B. It is also known that A _i B by (13). Then, by P-2, 
9 
A )- B which proves (20). (13) and (20) together establish the sufficiency part 
of the proposition. • 
1 have already mentioned the differences between the rule just charac-
terized and the relation ~*. There are situations where one may be interes-ted 
in strengthening ~he requirements for declaring a set preferred to another in 
terms of freedom. In the previous example about free press we were dealing 
with an issue of fundamental rights. Once any reasonable person agrees that 
no available journal represents a reasonable choice, we may ne.ed to impose a 
stronger criterion to discriminate between the two sets. One way of doing this 
is to use full lexicographic domination. 
The binary relation ~' that represents a lexicographic version of ~* is 
such that, 
for all A, BE Z, [A ~' B iff #maxi(A) ¿ #max'(B) for all i] (24) 
Proposition 3. ~ satisfies SND i , COMo P-l, P-3 and IMON' i/ a/1(/ only ij 
>- = >-' ~ ~. 
Prooj. The necessity part of the proposition is straightforward; I prove only 
the sufficiency part. Let ~ satisfy SNDi, COM, P-l, P-3 and IMON i . First, 1 
show: 
for all A, B E Z, if # maxi(A) = #maxi(B) for all i, then A ~ B. (25) 
Suppose A,BE Z and #maxi(A) = #maxi(B) = g. Let maxi(A) = 
{a" ... ,ag} and maxi(B) = {b" ... ,bq}. By SND i , 
{aJ} ~,i {bJ} (26) 
and 
(27) 
{aJ} n {bJ} = {a2} n {b2} = 0 and, further maxi({aJ}) = {aJ},max i({a2}) 
= {a2} and maxi({bJ}) = {bJ},max i ({b2}) = {b2} (since a"a2 E maxi(A) 
and b" b2 E max'(B)). Hence by (26), (27) and COM, I have 
{al ,a"} ~i {hl.h"}. 
By SND i, again, 
{ a3} ~, {h3}· 
By (28), (29) and COM, 
{al.u".u3} ~'{hl.h2.h3}· 
(28) 
(29) 
(30) 
Proceeding in this way, finally I have {UI, ... ,Cly } ~i{h" ... ,blJ}, that is 
max'(A) ~'max'(B). If A = maxi(A), then A ~i max'(B). Suppose 
{A\max'(A)} #- 0. Let {A\maxi(A)} = {a" ... ,¿¡m} #- 0. It is clear that 
TI = maxi(A) U {aJ} is such that T,~A and max i(A\TI )=0. Then by 
IMON i and (30), 1 have A ~i maxi(B) in this case. Thus, in all cases, 
(31 ) 
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Similarly, using IMON' in (31), A -' B for all i. By P-I, A - B which proves 
(25). 
Next, I show; 
for all A, B E Z, if #max'(A) > #max'(B) for all i, then A >- B. (32) 
Suppose A, B E Z and #maxi(A) > #maxi(B). Let #maxi(B) = 9 and 
#maxi(A) = 9 + I (where 1> O). Further, let maxi(B) = {b¡, ... , by} and 
maxi(A) = {a¡, ... ,a", ... ,aq+,}. Note that maxi{a¡, ... ,aq} = {a¡, ... ,a,,}. 
Hence, by (25), 
{a¡, ... ,aq}_iB. (33) 
Since maxi(A)={a¡, ... ,ay, ... ,ay+,}, it IS clear that T,/+¡= 
maxi{a¡, ... ,a,,}u{aq+d is such that {a¡, ... ,aq} ~ TII+¡' and 
max i (T,/+¡ \ {a¡, ... ,aq}) =1= 0. Then by IMON i and (33), it follows that 
and by (33) 
Tq+¡ >-i maxi(B). (34) 
Taking (34), adding a~/+2, ... ,a,,+, on the left hand ~ide, and using IMON i, I 
have 
(35) 
Taking (35) and using an argument similar to the one used to prove (31), by 
IMON i, ~ ha ve A >-i B, and this for al! i. By P-3 ,(B:::: A) which pro ves (32). 
Next, I show: 
f ., II A B Z .¡' { #maxi(A) > #max'(B) 01 a , E , 1 . . 
#max/(A) < #maxJ(B) 
then A is non comparable with B. (36) 
Using the previous argument, we ha ve A >-i B, and, by P-3, ,(B:::: A), 
B >-J A and o(A :::: B). Then A and B are non comparable. 
(25), (32) and (36), together, establish the sufficiency part of the proposi-
tion. • 
Both lexicographic rules turn out to be very similar in terms of the axioms 
that characterized them. They share in their characterizatÍons the axioms 
SNDi, COM, IMON i (that link them with ::::*) and P-l. The difference be-
tween :::: I and :::: 1 is due to axioms P-2 and P-3. While axiom P-2 gives deci-
sive power over the ranking of A and B to the first :?l'(pi) that discrimina tes 
between both sets, P-3 guarantees that once a decisive set of preferences .:?l'(pi) 
is found, they will not be contradicted by the ranking of the sets in terms of 
fn~edom. 
An example may darify the differences between :::: i and :::: ¡. Let 
A = {x, z, u} and B'= {w, u} be two sets of alternatives. Suppose that thé 
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preferences that any reasonable person may have in a society are as listed be-
low in columns: 
u - u - IV -
X U Y IV :;: 
V V Z x u 
IV X X V X 
Z y IV Y v 
y IV V U Y 
In each ranking shown aboye, the elements are arranged in strictly descending 
order of preference. We can easily see that A ~o B, A ~1 B, A ~2 B, A ~3 B, 
A ~4 B, A -<5 B. That means that according to the rules defined, A ~I B. 
However, A and B are declared non comparable by ?;: 1 • . 
5 Conc1uding remarks 
This paper analyses the role of preferences in assessing an agent's freedom of 
choice. Several authors have argued in favor of introducing preferences as the 
basis for the evaluation of opportunity sets in terrn's of freedom (Sen 1991, 
1993, Foster 1992, and Puppe 1996 among others).'1 incorporate the role of 
preferences in the evaluation of opportunity sets using an approach based on 
the notion of preference orderings that a reasonable person may have. The 
main idea is that sets of alternatives offer freedom only if they provide mean-
ingful choices to persons in a society. 1 argue that only the alternatives chosen 
by a reasonable person from the set of all possible ones provide a meaningful 
choice. This paper thus presents an axiomatiz¡¡.tion of the cardinality rule in 
this con tex t. 
There could be cases where the aspirations of a reasonable person cannot 
be fulfilled by the alternatives in a feasible set. For example, imagine a situa-
tion where the feasible set is composed of alternative ways in which one is to 
be executed. Even in this case, it may be possible to distinguish between dif-
ferent feasible sets in terms of freedom. For instance, in the context of our 
example, to be able to choose between being beheaded and being killed in the 
electric chair may be of sorne value. This situation can be considered using a 
'restricted' idea of freedom. Thisidea extends the previous approach by 
sequentially removing the first element in all reasonable persons' preferences 
and comparing the available sets of alternatives according to these new pref-
erences. Two different rules, a weak and a strong lexicographic version of the 
cardinality rule, are characterized using this restricted idea of freedom. 
In the analysis, alternatives outside an opportunity .set are relevant for 
assessing the freedom that this particular set offers. Such a specificatio·n of the 
set of relevant alternatives takes into account the fact that expectations playa 
role in analyzing freedom. For example, consider the possibility of going on a 
business trip from Europe to America in a sailboat. The existence of modern 
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ships and planesmakes this alternative irrelevant even if one can not afford a 
plane ticket. Thus, the perception that a particular agent has of her freedom 
depends not only on the feasible alternatives but al so on infeasible alternatives 
since the latter contribute towards shaping her aspirations and focusing her 
achievemen ts. 
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